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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEONARD M. OLSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
INDEPENDENT ORDER OF FOR-
ESTERS, a corporation, and THOMAS 
McGAHAN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8668 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The relevant facts involved in this appeal are few. 
Briefly stated they are as follows: (We will refer to the 
parties as they appeared below.) 
The plaintiff was charged with embezzlement upon a 
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complaint which was issued by the County Attorney of Salt 
Lake County and signed by Thomas McGahan, field auditor 
for the defendant. (Tr. 48-49) Upon this complaint the 
plaintiff was arrested and brought before the Honorable 
Leland G. Larsen, City Judge and Committing Magistrate 
for Salt Lake County, and released to the custody of his 
attorney. (Tr. 114) Sometime later a preliminary hearing 
on the criminal charge was held by Judge Larsen. At this 
hearing witnesses were called by the State and the plaintiff, 
and plaintiff also testified in his ovtn defense. (Tr. 115) Mter 
the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, plaintiff was bound 
over for trial upon a certificate of probable cause. (Tr. 114-
115, 129, 130) Plaintiff was later tried before the Honorable 
Ray VanCott, Jr. At-tne-~_l~_sio~of the State's~yi4~!1_c~, 
plaintiff moved to dis_nll~s. This motion was denied. (Tr. 
189--190). Th;-c-~e- was submittedto-tlie jury which duly 
acquitted the plaintiff.~ - ~ 
-- ~ ..... 
Following the acquittal this action was commenced 
against the defendant and Thomas McGahan. The latter was 
never served with Summons and the case proceeded to trial 
against the defendant, Independent Order of Foresters. 
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, defendant 
moved for a directed verdict whereupon the court dismissed 
the jury and dismissed the complaint. (Tr. 189-191) The 
complaint was dismissed upon the ground that the binding 
over of the plaintiff was a finding of probable cause and, in 
the abse~ce of evidence showing that the order binding the 
plaintiff over to answer the criminal charge was obtained 
by fraud, misrepresentation, perjured evidence or other un-
due or unfair meat1S practiced Or induced by -defe~d~t, 
constituted a complete defense to plaintiff's charge of ma-
licious prosecution. No evide'nce of any kind was offered 
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by plaintiff to prove that the order binding the plaintiff over 
for trial was tainted in any way by any improper act of 
defendant which induced or caused the Committing Magis-
trate to order plaintiff held for trial before the District 
Court or that plaintiff would not have been bound over 
except for such improper acts of defendant. No evidence 
was offered by defendant in its own defense. 
The foregoing facts are the only ones relevant or neces-
sary to be considered in deciding the correctness of the trial 
court's ruling. Because we think a recital of any other facts 
would only burden the court and be of no value in clarifying 
the issue to be decided here, we will omit any further refer-
ence to th.em. However, defendant does not accept as ac-
curate or correct many of the facts set out in plaintiff's 
brief which statement defendant believes is not supported 
by the record in many important and vital particulars. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
~ - - -,_....,._ ___ ~_ ~.-~ -- ---·- -·- .... -
lNG DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS WITH-
OUT_ DISPUTE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
PLAINTIFF WAS BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL AND 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS RESULTED 
FROM FRAUD, FALSE OR PERJURED TESTIMONY 
OR OTHER UNDUE MEANS PRACTICED BY DE-
FENDANT. 
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THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECT VER-
DICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAINTIFF'S 
EVIDENCE BECAUSE THE RECORD SHOWS WITH-
OUT DISPUTE THAT PROBABLE CAUSE WAS 
ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
PLAINTIFF WAS BOUND OVER FOR TRIAL AND 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THIS PJ:SULTED 
FROM FRAUD, FALSE OR PERJURED TESTIMONY 
OR OTHER UNDUE MEANS PRACTICED BY DE-
FENDANT. 
The d~fendant rests its case for affirmance upon the 
proposition that -whenlJlainti:ff was bound over by }udg~-­
Larsen-for-- trial upon theca~ plaint charging elll.bezzlement 
that order constituted a finding of __ P_!'<?bable cause for the 
issuance 'of the complaim as-~- ~atter ~f-Ta~.- 'thefeatte;-
this finding of probable ~~e c~l<.r only be--overco:meby 
competent evidence that the order was obtained by fraud, 
misrepresentation, perjured testimony or other undue means 
practiced or brought about or caused by defendant. (Ken-.; 
(nedy"1/. Burbidge, 54 Utah 497, 183 P. 325. ~ 
"'-4:tt....._ .. , 
The plaintiff made no attempt to overcome this finding 
by any evidence whatsoever. It is asserted by plaintiff that 
the order of the Committing Magistrate was only prima facie 
evidence of probable cause which was overcome by plain-
tiff's evidence. We thus have the issue squarely presented as 
to what is the legal effect of an order binding a defendant 
over to answer criminal charges? Defendant does not con-
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tend that an order binding a defendant over in a criminal 
proceeding is more than prima facie proof of probable cause. 
Even a judgment of conviction has no greater effe~t than 
to establish such prima" facie defep.se.---Kennedy V.-Burbidge, 
supra; Staton v. Mason, N. Y., 104 N. Y. S. 157; McElroy 
v. Catholic Press, Ill., 98 N. E. 527; Miller v. Runkle, Iowa, 
114 N. W. 611. What we do contend, however, is that it 
requires more than an acquittal by a jury to overthrow the 
presumption of probable cause and that no evidence of 
plaintiff's innocence, no matter how strong, will overthrow 
this presumption unless associated and connected with such 
evidence of innocence there is further competent evidence 
which shows that such order was obtained by fraud, perjury 
or other undue or unfair means. Kennedy v. Burbidge, 
supra; McElroy v. Catholic Press, supra. 
The plaintiff seeks to establish a distinction between a 
case where a plaintiff has_been c~n-~~~-ted which conviction is 
lat!.r set aside or reversed and a case where a plaintiff has been 
4eld on the order of a Committing Mag~strate .. for trial. We 
thi~k the distinction sought to be made is tenuous and with-
out substance and is contrary to the better authority. 
Many cases support the defendant in the contention that 
an order of a Committing Magistrate binding a defendant 
over has the same effect as a conviction. In 14_ALR 2d,312, 
-- -· . 
Sec. 13, the author says: 
((Although there is authority to the contrary, the 
numerical weight of authority, at least, is to the effect 
that where the complaint in an action for malicious 
prosecution shows on its face that a committing mag-
istrate found probable cause to bind plaintiff over to 
a higher court, or that the grand jury indicted,-~~~ 
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plain tiff must, in his pleading, g() ---f"LJ.xth~r than _a 
mere allegation of want of probable cause, and m~t 
plead --facts showing fraud or othe~_ improper means 
to overcome ~h~ presumption of probable cau~~Jir~jng 
from the fact that he was bound ovei-oy-tJ1e magis-
trate or indicted by the grand jury." 
In the case of Penton v. Canning, Wyo., 118 P. 2d 1005, 
the plaintiff sought to make the same distinction which the 
plaintiff here asserts must be made between a case where there 
is an order holding a plaintiff for trial and a case where a 
judgment of conviction has been obtained. That court re-
viewed the authorities and rejected the distinction and crit-
icized the case of Ross v. Hixon, Ka.n., 26 P. 955, upon which 
the plaintiff here relies. That court said: 
((It is urged for the plaintiff and respondent, 
Penton, that there is a (clear distinction which is made 
in the authorities between cases in which the commit-
ting magistrate has jurisdiction to and does finally, 
try, determine and convict the defendant and cases 
in which he merely sits as a committing magistrate', 
and the rule announced in Ross v. Hixon, supra, is 
insisted upon as the correct rule to govern the case at 
bar. 
So far as the Ross v. Hixon case is concerned, 
it is, we think, sufficient to say that in Giusti v. Del 
Papa, supra, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island 
pointedly criticises the position taken in the Hixon 
case, saying: (With all due deference, we feel con-
strained, for the reasons that we have given, to dissent 
from this conclusion. We do not think it follows 
that, because the binding over is orily prima facie 
evidence of probable cause, it is not necessary to at-
tack it in the petition for fraud or undue mean-s-; or, 
in other words, to aver such fraud or undU.e --means 
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to negative its effect. The pleader must state a_ cause 
of action, and he fails to d_o so_ u_nless he overthrows 
the j)rima -ficie effect of probabl~ cause arising from 
the binding over.'' * * * 
Relative to there being_ any __ (clear distinction' 
so far as iiaffects the matter of properly alleging the 
element of probable cause in a malicious prosecution 
action, as plaintiff urges and above recited, we are 
unable to see that that is so." 
See also Graham v. Buffalo General Laundries Corporation, 
N. Y., 184 N. E. 7 46; Dunn v. E. E. Gray Co., Mass., 150 
N. E. 166; Giusti v. Del Papa, R.I., 33 A. 525; White v. 
Pacific Telephone f5 Telegraph Co., Ore., 90 P. 2d 193. See 
also the dissenting opinion of Phillips in Stainer v. San Louis 
Valley Land f5 Mining Co., 8th C. C. A., 166 F. 220. There 
are many other cases cited in 14 A. L. R. 2d, supra. 
Plaintiff relies ~P()P. ]()_hnston v. Meaghr, 14 Utah 426, 
47 P. 8 61. This-~-~se goes no further than to say that the 
orders of magistrates binding defendants over on preliminary 
examinations are not conclusive but only furnish a prima 
facie presumption of p~obable cause. To this extent the case 
is in harmony with the Kennedy case. To the extent that 
it holds that evidence should be submitted to the jury 
that there was or was not probable -cause without a showing 
of fraud, false testimony, etc. it is overruled by the Kennedy 
c~-~~ and is not authority in this jurisdiction. 
The other cases on this point relied upon by plaintiff, 
notably,_Ross v. Hixon, supra, are either not in point or rep-
resent a minority view. 
There is no reason in logic why the finding of probable 
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cause by a committing magistrate should not have the same 
effect as a con-viction after a trial.- The -auihorities relied 
upon -by- defendant so-hold. Penton v. Canning, supra, and 
Giusti v. Del Papa, supra. The very purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to determine if there is cause to prosecute the party 
charged with a criminal offense. If the committing magis-
trate so finds then it should require as much evidence to 
overcome the prima facie effect of the order binding the 
defendant over as in the case of a conviction. It is no answer 
for plaintiff to assert, with no evidence or foundation in 
the record to support the claim, that preliminary hearings 
before justices are informal and lacking in judicial climate. 
The record in the case shows that the plaintiff was accorded 
a hearing, that he called witnesses and testified himself. Fur-
thermore, it is a fact well known to this Court that Judge 
Larsen, by whom plaintiff was committed, was a judge 
learned in the law and with many years of experience in 
presiding at trials of both civil and criminal cases. The argu-
ment of plaintiff is an attack upon the integrity of the 
approved judicial processes of this State. 
There is an additional reason why the proposition con-
tended for by plaintiff should not receive judJcial·~~~~tion in 
this State. Actions for malicious prosecution are not fayQ.r_ed 
in the law and are to be managed with great _c;~~t-~~!1· See 
Penton v. Canning, supra; Van Sant v. A1n. Express Co., 
158 Fed. 2d 924, 3rd C. C. A.; and Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray, 
Mass., 201. 
It would constitute a serious threat to the administra-
tion of justice to open the door to such actions if, every time 
a jury in a criminal case turns a defendant loose, no matter 
what the reason, including sympathy, he might with im-
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punity turn around and sue the one who had courage enough 
to sign the complaint, for malicious prosecution ~ithotl.!_ 
being also required to show in addition to acquittal, that his 
IJei~g held for trial was the result of improper acts committed 
by ___ th~__Q~fendant in securing such binding over. 
CONCLUSION 
Inasmuch as the plaintiff was bound over for trial on 
the charge of embezzlement, which constituted a finding 
of probable cause, and there is no evidence to rebut the prima 
facie defense of probable cause thereby established by a show-
ing that the order binding plaintiff over was obtained by 
fraud, perjured testimony or other unfair or undue means, 
the judgment of the trial court dismissing plaintiff's com-
plaint was proper and must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
ALBERT R. BOWEN, 
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